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Abstract— The rapid growth of networking and communication 
technologies results in amalgamation of 'Internet of Things' 
and 'Wireless sensor networks' to form WSNIT. WSNIT 
facilitates the WSN to connect dynamically to Internet and 
exchange the data with the external world. The critical data 
stored in sensor nodes related to patient health, environment 
can be accessed by attackers via insecure internet. To 
counterattack this, there is a demand for data integrity and 
controlled data access by incorporating a highly secure and 
light weight authentication schemes. In this context, Santanu et 
al had proposed an attribute based authentication framework 
for WSN and discussed on its security strengths. In this paper, 
we do a thorough analysis on Santanu et al scheme; to show 
that their scheme is susceptible to privileged insider attack and 
node capture attack. We also demonstrate that Santanu et al 
scheme consists of major inconsistencies which restrict the 
protocol execution.  
Keywords- WSN security, Authentication, Attribute based 
authentication, Elliptic Curve Cryptography, Smart cards. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The advances in internet technologies resulted in a 
dynamic internet called “Internet of Things” which can be 
labelled as a worldwide interconnection of distinctively 
addressable objects like RFID tags, sensors, Owens etc. The 
amalgamation of WSN and IoT allows mutual 
communication between external world and WSN by 
exchanging the information (patient health readings, 
environment data etc) sensed by sensors via Internet. 
However, accessing the sensor node via Internet raises 
security challenges, which need to be addressed to gain the 
advantage of the various benefits of such combination.   
To achieve the data integrity and controlled access to 
sensor data, there is a demand for secure authentication 
schemes to allow only the legitimate user having specified 
access attributes to connect to the WSN. Due to the resource 
constrained nature of sensor nodes, the authentication scheme 
should not result in execution of heavy weight cryptographic 
operations like encryption, decryption etc. by the sensor 
nodes.  
Various researchers had proposed protocols for secure 
authentication of users connecting to WSN [1-12] based on 
various techniques like password based [1-12], Temporal  
 
Credential based [1], biometric based [1,7], chinese 
remainder theorem based [3,4], identity based [5], bilinear 
pairing [6], ECC based [5,6,9,10], chaotic map based [8], 
attribute based [10,11,12] etc.,. Unfortunately, most of the 
protocols are analyzed insecure shortly, after they were put 
forward [1,2,3,4,5,6,8].  
In 2015, Santanu et al. [10] proposed an ECC-based user 
access control scheme with attribute-based encryption for 
WSN and claimed that their protocol achieves stronger 
security by resisting major cryptographic attacks. In this 
paper we will show that Santanu et al. scheme is completely 
vulnerable to privileged insider attack which leads to leakage 
of user password to an insider, vulnerable to node capture 
attack, which leads to leakage of user identity to an attacker. 
Also Santanu et al scheme requires huge data storage and 
computation cost for generating user smart card. We will also 
show that, Santanu et al scheme consists of many 
inconsistencies or anomalies in various phases of their 
protocol execution.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 
II, a brief review of Santanu et al. scheme is given. Section 
III, describes the security weakness of Santanu et al. scheme. 
In section IV, we discuss various inconsistencies of Santanu 
et al. scheme, section V provides the conclusion of the paper. 
II. REVIEW  OF  SANTANU ET AL SCHEME  
   In this section, we examine an effective ECC-based user 
access control scheme with attribute based encryption for 
WSN by Santanu et al [10] in 2015. The notations used in 
Santanu et al. [10] are listed below. 
Ui: User 
BS: Base station 
Sj: Sensor node 
CHu: Cluster head ‘ u’ 
PWi: Password of user Ui 
IDi: Identity of user Ui 
CIDu: Identifier of cluster head CHu 
h(.): A secure one-way hash function. 
x: Secret Key of base station 
X: Public Key of base station. 
MKCHu: Master key for cluster head CHu 
Registration Phase:            
          Ui                                                                   Base Station (B.S) 
 Selects:  IDi, ri, and PWi.  
Computes:  RPWi = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi).  
                                             {RPWi, IDi} 
                                                                                                     Receive at time TSUi 
                                                                                   Choose ‘yi’ specific to Ui 
                                                                                   Compute: Ai = h(IDi||TSUi) 
                                                                                                    Ri = h(RPWi||Ai) 
                                                                            Ui public key  Yi = yi.G 
                                                                         Selects an access structure Pi for each user Ui. 
                                                                  For each node ‘x’ in Pi, the B.S needs to construct a dx+1 degree      
                                       polynomial qx applying the Lagrange interpolation, where dx is the degree of the node ‘x’. 
                                       The BS then selects ‘m’ deployed cluster heads in the network CH1,CH2, .. CHm,  
                 Computes: m key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u <= m}, where Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)). 
 
S.C = {:(i) G (ii) TSUj (iii) Pj (iv) RUi (v) Kiu for each leaf node u  ε Pi, (vi) Yi, (vii) h(.), and  
                       (viii) m+m’ key-plus-id combinations {( Siu, CIDu) | 1<= u <= m+m’}, ri } . 
 
 
Login Phase : 
 
          Ui                                                                   Smart Card (S.C) 
provides  IDi, PWi. 
                                                         RPWi* =  h(IDi|| ri ||PWi), Ai* = h(IDi||TSUj) 
                                                         Ri* = h(RPWi*||Ai*) // check computed Ri* equals to the Ri stored in the S.C. 
                                                         Select a session specific arbitrary number ni.  
                                                         Computes Ni = ni.G. SKi = ni.Yi,  
                                                          Mi = h(Ri*|| TUi|| Nix), where Nix is the x-co-ordinate of Ni,  
                                                          TUi is the current time stamp.  
                                                          Selects a cluster head, say CHu 
                                                         Tiu = TUi⊕ Siu.  
                                                        <Ni||ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi )> to the BS, via a public channel. 
 
 
Authentication Phase : 
 
  Base Station (B.S)                                                                Cluster Head ‘U’ (CHu) 
Receive : <Ni||ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu ||Mi )> at TSUi 
Computes: SKi* = yi.Ni. 
‘yi’ is a secret key assigned to Ui by B.S during registration phase.  
Decrypts DSKix(ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu ||Mi ) to get {IDi, CIDu, Tiu, Mi}. 
Siu* = h(TSUi||(TCHu⊕WCHu)),  
TSUi is the time stamp at which the B.S received the Ui registration request. 
TUi* = Tiu ⊕ Siu*, Mi* = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix) 
Check Mi*  = received Mi. If both are equal, B.S confirms the authenticity of Ui.  
BS computes T1 = h(TUi*||TBS)  
Computes: EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||TBS|| Ni|| T1|| Yi||TSUi).  
                                         <EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||TBS||Ni|| T1|| Yi||TSUi)>  
                                                                                  Receive: EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi) 
                                                                                  DMKCHu[EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)] 
                                                                                 Validate CIDu. 
                                                                                 Check if |TBS-TBS*| < ∆T, where TBS* is the received time. 
                                                                          Computes : Siu* = h(TSUi|| (TCHu⊕WCHu)) // stored in CHu memory 
                                                                                                    TUi* = Tiu ⊕ TCHu, T1* = h(TUi*||TBS). 
                                                                                 Check: computed T1* equals the received T1 
 
Master Key Encryption Phase : 
 
Cluster Head ‘U’ (CHu)                                                                User (Ui) 
 
Compute:  K3 = (Bu + Y) (mod p) 
Bu and Y are stored in CHu memory 
K2u = (Bu + Tu) for all the attributes u ε Iu 
Kiu = h(CIDu|| IDi|| TUi*|| Nix|| TCHu), Ksi = h(Kiu|| K3) 
M1 = EKsi(M).   
                <M1||TSCHu||(TCHu⊕WCHu)||TCHu||h(IDi||CIDu||TSCHu||M1)|| K2u for all u ε Iu > 
 
 
Data Decryption Phase 
 
User (Ui)                                                                                   Cluster Head ‘U’ (CHu) 
Receive : 
<M1||TSCHu||(TCHu⊕WCHu)||TCHu||h(IDi||CIDu||TSCHu||M1)|| K2u for all u ε Iu > 
Compute: h(IDi||CIDu||TSCHu||M1)    
Compare the computed hash with the received. 
Check |TSCHu*- TSCHu| < ∆T 
Retrieve WCHu from  TCHu⊕WCHu 
Validate WCHu.  
Access(KuUi+ K2u) = ((qx(0)-ti)g+(Bi+Ti)) (mod p)  
= (qr(0)-ti)g+(bi+ti)g) (mod p) =  
(y+bi)g (mod p) = (yg+big) (mod p) = K3*  
where qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)), qr(0) = y and qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)) 
Kiu = h(CIDu||IDi||TUi|| Nix||TSCHu) and Ksi = h(Kiu||K3*)) 
DKsi(M1) = DKsi(EKsi(M)) = M 
 
A. Pre Deployment Phase  
The base station (BS) performs the following steps in 
offline mode before the actual deployment of the sensor 
nodes and cluster heads in deployment field. 
Step 1. B.S selects a  large odd prime number ‘p’ of 
minimum 160 bits, generates a Galois Field G.F (p) and 
elliptic curve Ep(a,b), which is a set of all points on the curve 
y2 = x3+ax+b (mod p), such that a,b ε Zp = {0,1,2,3....p-1}, 
satisfying the condition 4a3+ 27b2  ≠ 0. ‘G’ represents the 
base point of elliptic curve ‘E’ of order ‘n’, which is of 160 
bits such that n>√p.  B.S chooses a random number ‘x’ as its 
secret private key, computes its public key = X = x.G.  
Step 2. B.S generates a random number ti for each attribute 
i ε universe of all the sensor attributes set I. Computes Ti = 
ti.G.  
Step 3. Finally, the BS loads the following information into 
the memory of each cluster head CHu (u = 1, 2, . . ., m): a 
unique identifier CIDu, assigns a set of attributes Iu from 
global attribute set I. Assigns a master key MKCHu and a 
secret key Ku and Bu = bu.G (bu is known only to B.S ), a 
time stamp TCHu and its expiration time WCHu. B.S pre loads 
CIDu, EP(a,b), G, Iu, MKCHu, Bu, Ku, Tu, TCHu, WCHu. 
Step 4. For each deployed sensor node Sj: The B.S assigns a 
unique identity SIDj and assigns a set of attributes Ij from 
global set I. Assigns a master key MKSj. B.S pre loads SIDj, 
Ij, MKSj for each sensor node. 
B. Registration Phase 
     This phase is invoked whenever a user Ui registers with 
the base station for the first time. 
Step 1. The user Ui selects the identifier IDi, a random 
number ri, and the password PWi. Ui then computes RPWi = 
h(IDi|| ri ||PWi). Ui provides the computed masked password 
RPWi and IDi to the base station via a secure channel for 
registration. 
Step 2. On receiving the login request {RPWi, IDi} at time 
TSUi, the BS computes the following variables for Ui. Ai = 
h(IDi||TSUi), secret masked information Ri = h(RPWi||Ai). 
B.S also selects a secret key ‘yi’ for each user Ui and 
computes the Ui public key  Yi = yi.G. 
Step 3. The B.S selects an access structure Pi for each user 
Ui. After receiving the registration information from the 
valid users, the B.S assigns the access structure Pi for each 
Ui. These access structures are implemented through access 
tree. Every leaf nodes of the access tree is labeled with an 
attribute like ‘Doctor’ or ‘Nurse’ etc. The non-leaf nodes are 
reflected as a threshold gates. The access structures are 
symbolized using the logic expressions over the attributes. 
The privilege of user Ui is defined with the help of an access 
tree. For each node ‘x’ in Pi, the B.S needs to construct a 
dx+1 degree polynomial qx applying the Lagrange 
interpolation, where dx is the degree of the node ‘x’. 
Step 4. For each non-root node ‘x’ in Pi, it sets qx(0) = 
qparent(x)(index(x)), in which parent(x) is the parent of ‘x’ and 
index(x)  denotes the index(x)-th child element of root node 
‘x’. The B.S then assigns qr(0) = y, where qr(0) is the 
polynomial of the root of the access tree of the user Ui. 
Finally the B.S computes Kiu =  (qi(0)-ti) (mod p) for each 
leaf node i ε Pi. 
Step 5. The BS then selects ‘m’ deployed cluster heads in 
the network CH1,CH2,…,CHm, which will be deployed 
during the initial deployment phase, and computes the m 
key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u <= m}, where 
Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)).  
Step 6. For dynamic cluster head addition phase, the m’ 
cluster heads, CHm+1, CHm+2, . . ., CHm+m’, will be deployed 
later,  after the initial deployment in the network, in order to 
replace some compromised cluster heads, if any, and add 
some fresh cluster heads along with sensor nodes. For this 
purpose, the BS assigns the unique identity CIDu* and unique 
master key MKCHu*. Similarly the B.S assigns the unique 
identity SIDj *, and unique master key MKSj *. 
Step 7. Finally, the BS issues a tamper-proof smart card with 
the following parameters stored in it :(i)G (ii) TSUi (iii) Pi 
(iv)RUi (v) Kiu for each leaf node u  ε Pi, (vi) Yi, (vii) h(.), 
and (viii) m+m’ key-plus-id combinations {( Siu, CIDu) | 
1<= u <= m+m’}. The value of m + m’ is chosen according 
to memory availability of the smart card.  
Step 8. On receiving the S.C from B.S, Ui inserts ri into its 
S.C. 
C. Login Phase 
   Whenever the user Ui wants to access real-time data from 
a sensor of a deployed WSN, the user Ui needs to perform 
the following steps: 
Step 1. Ui inserts his/her smart card into the card reader of a 
specific terminal and provides his/her Identity IDi, password 
PWi. 
Step 2. The smart card then computes the masked password 
of the user Ui as RPWi* =  h(IDi|| ri ||PWi), Ai* = h(IDi||TSUi), 
using the time stamp TSUi stored in Ui S.C.  S.C further 
computes Ri* = h(RPWi*||Ai*), and then checks whether the 
computed Ri* equals to the Ri stored in the S.C. If this 
verification fails, it means Ui provided the incorrect 
credentials and terminates the session, else the smart card 
proceeds to perform the following steps. 
Step 3. The S.C selects a session specific arbitrary number 
ni and computes Ni = ni.G. The S.C computes SKi = ni.Yi, Mi 
= h(Ri*|| TUi|| Nix), where Nix is the x-co-ordinate of Ni, TUi 
is the current time stamp of Ui.  
Step 4. The user Ui selects a cluster head, say CHu from 
which the real time data can be accessed inside WSN. 
Corresponding to CHu, the smart card computes Tiu = TUi⊕ 
Siu. Finally, the user Ui sends the message <Ni||ESKix 
(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi )> to the BS, via a public channel. 
D.   Authentication Phase 
   On receiving the login request message <Ni||ESKix 
(IDi||CIDu||Tiu ||Mi )> from the user Ui, the BS performs the 
following steps in order to authenticate the user Ui. 
Step 1. The BS computes SKi* = yi.Ni where ‘yi’ is a secret 
key assigned to Ui by B.S during registration phase. Using 
this computed key SKi*, the BS decrypts DSKix(ESKix (IDi|| 
CIDu||Tiu ||Mi ) to get {IDi, CIDu, Tiu, Mi}. 
Step 2. The BS computes Siu* = h(TSUi||(TCHu⊕WCHu)), 
where TSUi is the time stamp at which the B.S received the 
Ui registration request, TCHu is the boot straped time stamp 
for CHu and WCHu is its validity. B.S retrives TUi* = Tiu ⊕ 
Siu* and computes Mi* = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix). B.S compares the 
computed Mi* with the received Mi. If both are equal, B.S 
confirms the authenticity of Ui.  
Step 3. Using the current system time stamp TBS, the BS 
computes T1 = h(TUi*||TBS) and produces a cipher text 
message, encrypted using the master key MKCHu of the 
cluster head CHu as EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||TBS|| Ni|| T1|| 
Yi||TSUi). The BS directs the message <EMKCHu(IDi|| 
CIDu||Tiu||TBS||Ni|| T1|| Yi||TSUi)> to the corresponding 
cluster head CHu. 
Step 4. After receiving the message in Step3 from the BS, 
the cluster head CHu decrypts EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| 
TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi) using its own master key MKCHu as 
DMKCHu[EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)]= (IDi|| 
CIDu|| Tiu|| TBS||  Ni||  T1|| Yi|| TSUi). CHu then checks if 
retrieved CIDu  is equal to its identity i.e CIDu. If both are 
equal, CHu further checks if |TBS-TBS*| < ∆T, where TBS* is 
the received system time stamp of the CHu and ∆T is the 
allowed valid transmission delay. If it holds good, CHu 
computes Siu* = h(TSUi|| (TCHu⊕WCHu)) using its boot 
straped TCHu and its expiration time WCHu. CHu proceeds to 
compute TUi* = Tiu ⊕ TCHu, using the retrieved TUi*, CHu 
computes T1* = h(TUi*||TBS). If the computed T1* equals the 
received T1, CHu authenticates B.S.  Finally, CHu performs 
master key encryption phase which forwards the login reply 
message to Ui. Ui performs the data decryption phase in 
respond to master encryption phase.  
E.  Master Key Encryption Phase 
   In this phase, any user CHu performs the following steps: 
Step 1. CHu computes K3 = (Bu + Y) (mod p), based on the 
stored values of Bu and Y. CHu further computes K2u = (Bu 
+ Tu) for all the attributes u, where u ε Iu for that cluster head 
CHu. 
Step 2. As per the user Ui request, the cluster head CHu 
computes Kiu = h(CIDu||IDi|| TUi*|| Nix||TCHu), Ksi = h(Kiu|| 
K3). CHu encrypts the sensor data M using Ksi i.e M1 = 
EKsi(M).   
Step 3. CHu forwards the authentication reply message 
<M1||TSCHu||( TCHu⊕WCHu)|| TCHu||h(IDi||CIDu|| TSCHu|| 
M1)|| K2u for all u ε Iu > to Ui, where  TSCHu is the current 
time stamp of CHu.  
F.  Data Decryption Phase 
   Step1. On receiving the message from the cluster head 
CHu, during the master key and data encryption phase, the 
user Ui, computes a hash value h(IDi||CIDu||TSCHu|| M1) 
based on the received values of TSCHu, M1. If the computed 
hash value equals the received hash value, Ui proceeds 
further, else terminates the session. Ui further compares 
|TSCHu*- TSCHu| < ∆T, if it is valid, Ui further computes WCHu 
from  TCHu⊕WCHu and validates the expiration time i.e WCHu 
>= TCHu. If the condition is valid, Ui authenticates CHu else 
terminates the connection. 
Step 2.  On successful authentication of CHu, Ui starts the 
decrypts process from leaf nodes of its own access tree, in a 
bottom to top up approach. Ui computes Fa for each leaf node 
‘l’ in Pi using the following logic: if ‘a’ ε Iu, the Fa = Access 
(KuUi+ K2u) else Fa = ǂ (invalid). For the user Ui, the access 
tree is Pi for which the root node is ‘r’. If Pix is the sub-tree 
of Pi, Pix is rooted at node x. If a set of attributes Iu satisfies 
the access tree Pix, then only we obtain Access (KuUi*g + K2i) 
= (y+bi)g (mod p), which is shown in the following steps: 
Access(KuUi+ K2u) = ((qx(0)-ti)g+(Bi+Ti)) (mod p) = (qr(0)-
ti)g+(bi+ti)g) (mod p) = (y+bi)g (mod p) = (yg+big) (mod p) 
= K3* where qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)), qr(0) = y and qx(0) = 
qparent(x)(index(x)), is executed in a recursive way as discussed in 
[12].  
Step 3. The user Ui computes Kiu = h(CIDu||IDi||TUi|| Nix|| 
TSCHu) and Ksi = h(Kiu||K3*)) and then uses the key Ksi to 
decrypt DKsi(M1) = DKsi(EKsi(M)) = M.   
III.   CRYPTANALYSIS OF SANTANU ET AL  SCHEME 
     In this segment, we will cryptanalyze the Santanu et al 
[10] scheme and illustrate that Santanu et al scheme is 
vulnerable to privileged insider attacker, node capture 
attack. Also we will illustrate that Santanu et al scheme 
consists of few anomalies or inconsistencies which restricts 
the protocol flow.  
Attack Model: 
1)  An opponent or an attacker or legal user can extract 
the information cached in the smart card by several 
techniques such as power consumption or leaked 
information [10] etc. i.e S.C = {:(i) G (ii) TSUj (iii) Pj (iv) 
RUi (v) Kiu for each leaf node u  ε Pi, (vi) Yi, (vii) h(.), and 
(viii) m+m’ key-plus-id combinations {( Siu, CIDu) | 1<= u 
<= m+m’}, ri } . 
  
2) An opponent can passive monitor or eavesdrop or alter or 
replay the login request, login reply messages communicated 
among Ui, B.S, CH over a public channel which is Internet. 
i.e {{Ni||ESKix(IDi||CIDu||Tiu||Mi}, { EMKCHu(IDi|| 
CIDu||Tiu||TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)}, {<M1|| TSCHu || (TCHu 
⊕WCHu)|| TCHu||h(IDi|| CIDu||TSCHu|| M1) || K2u for all u ε Iu 
>}} 
 
A. Huge Data Storage and Computation Requirement for 
Generating User Smart Card 
   In Santanu et al. scheme the user smart card memory is 
stored with ‘m’ key-plus-id combinations {(Siu, CIDu)| 1<=u 
<= m}, where Siu = h(TSUi||( TCHu⊕WCHu)) of all cluster 
heads in the WSN. Based on the Santanu et al. discussion, 
for a total of 20,000 sensor nodes to be deployed and if each 
cluster head can handle 200 sensor nodes, then there are total 
m = 100 cluster heads needed and for dynamic cluster head 
addition m’ =100 cluster heads are reserved. So a total of 
m+m’ = 100+100 (Siu, CIDu) details are stored. A total of 
200 hash operations need to be performed for each user 
smart card. If the system contains ‘n’ users, then a total  of 
(n * 200) hash operations need to be performed to load the 
smart card memory of corresponding user which requires 
huge computation cost from the BS. The major issue is that, 
the user may not interested or in need of data from all the 
cluster heads. Hence storing all the m+m’ cluster head 
details is a major drawback in Santanu et al scheme.  
    Suppose, if any cluster head CHu* is found to be 
compromised, the B.S re assigns the master key MKCHu*, 
identity CIDu*, set of identities Iu*, Bu* = bu.G (bu is known 
only to B.S), a time stamp TCHu* and its expiration time 
WCHu*. Apart from re assigning the values of compromised 
CHu*, the S.C values of all the users whose key-plus-Id 
combination contains CHu must be modified, which requires 
huge computation cost. 
B. Fails to Resists Privileged Insider Attack  
   As demonstrated by A.K Das et al in their recent work [1], 
(one of the authors of the Santanu et al [10] scheme), 
performed an insider attack, we will apply same strategy on 
Santanu et al scheme, which is described as follows: 
Step 1. Assume that the privileged insider ‘E’ stolen or gets 
the smart card of Ui for a while, then, ‘E’ can launch offline 
password guessing attack as follows: 
Step2.  As discussed in 2.3, during registration phase of Ui, 
Ui submits the login request {RPWi, IDi} where RPWi = 
h(IDi|| ri ||PWi). From the login request ‘E’ intercepts IDi, 
from the stolen smart card of Ui, ‘E’ can get ri. Now from the 
intercepted value of RPWi = h(IDi|| ri ||PWi), ‘E’ can perform 
guessing attack [1] on Ui password from a moderately small 
dictionary, over the subsequent steps.  
Step 2.1). Choose a guessed password PWi to be PWi*.   
Step 2.2). Compute RPWi* = h(IDi||ri||PWi*) and compare the 
computed RPWi* with the intercepted value of RPWi during 
registration phase. If RPWi* equals RPWi, then the guessed 
password PWi* is the correct one, else ‘E’ proceeds with 
another guessed password PWi* from the dictionary and 
follows the same steps.  
Hence, in Santanu et al scheme, the insider on getting the 
stolen S.C of Ui can compute the Ui password.  
C. Fails to Resists Node Capture Attack  
   A sensor node capture attack is a WSN specific physical 
type of attack. As the sensor nodes and cluster heads are not 
equipped with tamper resistant hardware, the attacker can 
capture a legitimate sensor node or cluster head in WSN and 
can extract the secret information stored in it. Each cluster 
head and sensor node is pre-loaded with the master keys i.e 
MKCHu and M.K.Sj respectively. On receiving the login 
request <Ni||ESKix (IDi|| CIDu || Tiu|| Mi )> from Ui, the base 
station computes and forwards a message to the 
corresponding cluster head CHu which is encrypted with its 
master key i.e  <EMKCHu(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| 
TBS||Ni||T1||Yi||TSUi)>. If an attacker captures the cluster 
head CHu can retrieve its master key MKCHu which is stored 
in its hardware, as discussed above, an attacker ‘E’ can 
capture all the communications between the protocol 
entities, hence, ‘E’ can capture the message sent by B.S to 
CHu and can decrypt it to get DMKCHu(EMKCHu(IDi|| CIDu|| 
Tiu|| TBS||Ni|| T1||Yi||TSUi)) = {IDi, CIDu,Tiu, TBS, Ni, T1, Yi, 
TSUi} which involves the identity of the logged in user i.e 
IDi. Therefore, we can conclude that, in Santanu et al 
scheme, if an attacker captures a cluster head, he can extract 
the secret key stored in it and can decrypt the messages 
forwarded to the cluster head to get the identity of the user 
logged in. Hence, we can conclude that Santanu et al scheme 
fails to resist identity leakage attack.  
IV. ANALYSIS OF INCONSISTENCIES IN SANTANU ET AL 
SCHEME  
In this section, we discuss few anomalies or 
inconsistencies found in Santanu et al [10] scheme.     
A. Inconsistencies in Registration Phase:  
     In Santanu et al scheme, during registration phase, the 
Base Station B.S computes the variables Ai = h(IDi||TSUi), 
Ri = h(RPWi||Ai) where TSUi is the time at which the B.S 
received the registration request from Ui. B.S also selects a 
secret key yi for Ui and computes the Ui public key  Yi = yi.G. 
1)  Inconsistency 1:  
    In Santanu et al scheme, the authors didn’t mentioned 
clearly on how the base station stores the value ‘Ri’ and the 
secret key ‘yi’ assigned to each user in its database, to use 
these values in authentication phase.   
B. Inconsistencies in Authentication Phase:  
    In this section, we discuss the inconsistencies found in 
authentication phase of Santanu et al scheme. 
1)  Inconsistency 1:  
     In Santanu et al scheme, during the registration phase, 
S.C submits the login request message <Ni||ESKix 
(IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi )> to the BS, in which Ni = ni.G, where 
‘ni’ is an arbitrary number chosen by S.C specific to the 
current login request. SKi = ni.Yi, where Yi = yi.G is the Ui 
public key computed out of  a secret key ‘yi’ assigned to Ui 
by the B.S. SKix is the x-co-ordinate of SKi.  
On receiving the login request from Ui, B.S proceeds to 
compute SKi = yi.Ni. To compute SKi, B.S needs ‘yi’, which 
is secret key of Ui assigned by B.S. The login request 
contains two parts Ni, which is a random one and doesn’t 
contains any clue about the user identity. The second part of 
login request ESKix (IDi||CIDu||Tiu|| Mi) is encrypted using 
SKix, which is also a random value and doesn’t contain any 
clue about the user details. Therefore it is impossible for a 
B.S to identify from which user, it got the login request. 
Hence, it is impossible to retrieve ‘yi’ a user specific value 
to compute SKi.  
2) Inconsistency 2 
     In Santanu et al scheme, as discussed in section 2.5 
(authentication phase), step 2, the B.S computes Mi* = h(Ri 
||TUi|| Nix). To compute Mi*, B.S requires the value ‘Ri’. In 
Santanu et al scheme, the B.S is computing ‘Ri’ during Ui 
registration phase, but as discussed in 4.1.2, it is not clear in 
which format, the B.S stores Ri in its data base. One option 
for B.S is to compute Ri i.e Ri* = h(RPWi*||Ai*) where  Ai* = 
h(IDi||TSUi), RPWi = h(IDi || ri ||PWi). B.S doesn’t know Ui 
password PWi, identity IDi, random number chosen by Ui i.e 
ri. Hence, it is impossible to compute Ri* by B.S. In 
summary, B.S is not storing Ri* and doesn’t have the 
required parameters to compute Ri*. Therefore, computing 
Mi* = h(Ri ||TUi|| Nix) is impossible for B.S.  
V.   CONCLUSION 
     Recently Santanu et al. proposed an ECC-based user 
access control scheme with attribute-based encryption for 
WSN. Even though it is a novel attempt, after thorough 
analysis of Santanu et al paper, we demonstrated that their 
scheme is vulnerable to privilege insider attack and node 
capture attack. We also established that Santanu et al scheme 
include major inconsistencies which oppose the correct 
protocol execution. In future work, we aim to propose a 
secure and light weight authentication scheme for WSN by 
eliminating the security pitfalls and inconsistencies found in 
Santanu et al scheme.  
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